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The few tantalizing references left me wishing for more extensive
discussions on informal dispute resolution, the problems of discretionary
decision making, and the function of law in mediating between individuals
and institutions. Macdonald is a master at articulating the underlying
structure and issues at stake in legal policy discussions.4 It is a fine thing
that he turned his expertise to making these discussions more broadly
accessible, but I find his tales too modest indeed as they stop short of telling
us what is at stake.
However, it is too easy a critique to point at what is missing from a
well-intentioned effort. The genius of this collection is in its simple
illustration of how legal meaning may be accomplished from social facts.
Macdonald's anecdotes provide not only precious springboards to illustrate
legal concepts, but also illustrate, with authoritative ease, the relative
seamlessness between law and ordinary life.

PREJUDICIALAPPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OFAMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWBY ROBERT C. POST WITH K.
ANTHONY APPIAH, JUDITH BUTLER, THOMAS C. GREY &
REVA B. SEIGEL (DURHAM, DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001)
184 pages.'
BY SONIA LAWRENCE

2

[A] sign on a courthouse door proclaiming "Men Only" evokes an entire history of
discrimination against a historically disadvantaged class; a sign on a barroom door that reads
"No Minors" fails to similarly offend.
Gosselin v. Quebec (A.G.)3

4 As a mere representation of Macdonald's extensive oeuvre,
see R.A. Macdonald, "A Theory of

Procedural Fairness" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3; Roderick A. Macdonald, "Understanding
Regulation by Regulations" in Ivan Bernier & Andr~e Lajoie, eds., Regulations,Crown Corporationsand
Administrative Tribunals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 89; Roderick A. Macdonald,
"Access to Justice and Law Reform" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 287; Ontario Law Reform
Commission, Study Paperon Prospects for Civil Justice (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission,
1995) (Roderick A. Macdonald) (an initiative of the Ontario Civil Justice Review entailing a
fundamental reconsideration of civil disputing in Ontario). Between 1989-1991, Macdonald chaired a
Task Force on Access to Civil Justice in Quebec.
I [PrejudicialAppearances].
2 Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This review benefitted from the excellent

research assistance of Pinta Maguire and the advice of my colleagues Bruce Ryder and Kate Sutherland.
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 at 469 [Gosselin].
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The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
evenl the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
Oliver Wendell Holmes'

I.

INTRODUCTION

What are the rules behind Canada's constitutional equality
doctrine? How do we know that "Men Only" on a courtroom door is
discriminatory differentiation and that "No Minors" on a barroom door is
not? As the rationale behind Canada's constitutional equality doctrine
becomes increasingly murky, the need heightens for a deeper consideration
of these questions. PrejudicialAppearancesis a model for the next stage of
Canadian equality scholarship.
The book is a reprint of six articles that appeared in volume 88 of
the California Law Review in 2000. The lead article, by University of
California at Berkeley Boalt Hall Professor Robert C. Post, sketches out a
critique of American anti-discrimination law, and suggests a reconception
of it. Professors Anthony Appiah, Judith Butler, Thomas C. Grey, and
Reva B. Seigel, all noted scholars of equality, supply their reactions to
Post's suggestion, with Post allowed a final word. This format is extremely
effective in that it allows the four responders to take their own approach
while ensuring that, at least at some level, they are all talking about the
same thing. The responses reflect the different concerns, viewpoints, and
expertise of the writers. They give Post's ideas the scrutiny, development,
and critique that serve to further illustrate the fundamental nature of the
challenge he is posing to anti-discrimination law. The result is an admirably
compact piece of work that poses a challenge to contemporary
understandings of anti-discrimination law. Although the book is tightly
focused on American law, the ideas and questions raised within will be of
interest to Canadians. Reading the book may force us beyond the smugness
we often feel when looking at American anti-discrimination law, to some
recognition of the hard questions that lie ahead and that have gone
unanswered in the past within our own equality jurisprudence.
Post argues that the logic behind American anti-discrimination law
not only fails to alleviate discrimination but, in fact, perpetuates it. By
focusing on the transcendental human dignity of the individual (some
acontextual core shared by all people), and by claiming non-differentiation
4 The Common Law, ed. by Mark De\Volfe Howe (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1963) at
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as a central principle, anti-discrimination law has failed in what ought to be
its true goal-transforming social practices that define, maintain, and
regulate oppressive categorizations. By describing race, gender, and other
grounds of discrimination as factors that ought to be completely irrelevant
in decision making, anti-discrimination law displays its internal logic--a
logic of wilful blindness to characteristics that are socially relevant. Because
of this continuing and unacknowledged social relevance, it is a logic that is
doomed to failure both as jurisprudential rule and as transformative
practice.
The law refuses to recognize both its own status as a social practice
and the social significance of otherwise "illegal" grounds of discrimination,
says Post.6 Although the jurisprudence claims to be about eliminating the
social significance of categories like gender and race, law itself is a social
practice in which such categories maintain their significance. Judgments are
at odds with the guiding principle under which they are purportedly written,
because "[jJudges have in fact been compelled systematically to disguise and
contort their judgments so as to render them compatible with the surface
logic of the dominant conception."' Jettisoning that "surface logic" would
produce increased "accountability, doctrinal integrity, purposive clarity,"
and an elimination of the "obsessive and dysfunctional focus on explicit
racial classifications." '
Even if one agrees with Post that the goal of anti-discrimination law
ought not to be the effacement of socially significant practices like gender
and race, one should not hold one's breath for his resolution, because he
does not provide one.9 The sociological account does not provide us with
a purpose for anti-discrimination law. It simply describes the operation of
law as a social practice. In so doing, it suggests that the current "logic"
(which in the U.S., at least, is one largely based on the idea of "blindness")
is one at odds with the actual operation of law as a social practice. The
sociological account brings to the fore the normative goals of antidiscrimination law, without telling us what those normative goals are or
ought to be.

5 Robert C. Post, "Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law" in
PrejudicialAppearances, supra note 1, 1 at 12.
6 Ibid. at 17.
7 Ibid. at 52.
8 Ibid.
9 For Post's discussion of the principled possibilities for anti-discrimination law see
ibid. at 41, n.
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The other authors provide their commentary on different aspects
of the work. Anthony Appiah addresses the issue of stereotypes, a central
phenomenon in anti-discrimination law. l° Appiah's careful read of Post
prompts him to point out that there are at least three kinds of stereotypes.
At a time when the precise place and significance of stereotyping in
Canadian constitutional equality law remains unclear, this is a thoughtful
effort to provide clarity that could illuminate aspects of our own law and
provide a glimpse of the way forward.
Also interesting from the contemporary Canadian perspective is
Thomas Grey's contribution." He puts forth the argument that trusting
judges with applying a sociological approach will almost surely lead to
findings that familiar practices are not "invidious."'" Still, even Grey, in the
end, supports the contextual over the abstract approach to antidiscrimination. Judith Butler's contribution concentrates on the
philosophical questions raised by Post's approach to appearance and
personhood."3 Are people more than their appearance or the social
practices that constitute that appearance? Post has positioned himself
against "transcendental seduction," the idea that we can deal with people
apart from their appearance or that there is some irreducible core of
personhood, and Butler explores the implications of that rejection.
The essay written by Reva Siegel is the best of a good lot. 4 Her
detailed historical approach provides the stiffest support for Post's
suggestions and the most telling critique. She argues that Post's argument
lacks a recognition of social stratification and the institutions by which it is
maintained over time. Siegel's own work has focused on the idea of
"preservation through transformation, ' ' 15 in which she takes a sociohistorical approach to demonstrate the persistence of status hierarchies,
despite the elimination of formal categorization on forbidden grounds.
How, Siegel asks, is social stratification maintained even as all the
institutions for its maintenance are attacked? The answer, she argues, is in
10

K. Anthony Appiah, "Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity" in PrejudicialAppearances,
supra

note 1, 55.
11Thomas C. Grey, "Cover Blindness" in PrejudicialAppearances,supra note
1, 85.
12Ibid. at 96. For instance, spousal assault, the prohibition on interracial marriage, segregated
schools, and gender restrictions on access to professions--in the past, all of these practices have been
understood as normal, natural, and non-invidious.
13 Judith Butler, "'Appearances Aside' in PrejudicialAppearances, supra note 1, 73.
14 Reva B. Siegel, "Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How 'Color Blindness' Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification" in PrejudicialAppearances,supra note 1, 99.
15 Ibid. at 143, n. 109.
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the dynamic nature of rules and rationales. 6
Siegel's rich and complex argument, in a nutshell, is this: Antidiscrimination law has treated race as a categorization with no social
relevance. Thus, where it is used as a categorization, it is presumptively
irrelevant. Yet race is of profound social relevance. Siegel argues that the
prohibition of formalized racial classification has failed to prevent
discrimination or to promote any substantial changes in the differential
distribution of social goods. Since so many things are race neutral but race
salient, to use Siegel's language, we can maintain hierarchies based on race
without mentioning race. Consider, for instance, college admission
preferences based on parental alumni status, where admission has
traditionally been segregated. Likewise, the fact that tax revenues received
by a school district are mainly funded by property taxes in the district is race
neutral but race salient. Siegel argues, in a discussion that ought to be of
particular interest to the Canadian reader, that this argument must proceed
on the basis that race has no social relevance. The new logic of antidiscrimination law allows the claim that since racial classification is literally
outlawed, differences in current distribution are the just result of equal
distribution of opportunity. In other words, it is easy to come up with
language that is race and gender neutral, per American law, to describe
social phenomena that are highly race or gender salient, per contemporaryAmerican common understanding. When presented with these two
arguments in conflict, that is, race and gender neutrality versus race and
gender salience, judges can choose the first without acknowledging the
second.
APPLYING POST'S INSIGHTS AT HOME

II.

Canadian equality jurisprudence seems to be teetering on the edge
of Post's insights. We are not stuck in the trope of blindness that has largely
stalled the development of American constitutional equality doctrine since
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 7 This is a critical distinction as Canadian law has
not been interpreted to categorically prohibit differential treatment and, in
fact, it is clear in both text and interpretation that equality may require
recognition of difference. 8 We have settled on a regime of substantive
16

Ibid. at 106.

17
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
18See CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15(2), Part 1of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.ll [Charter]. See also Eaton v. Brant County Board
of Education, [19971 1 S.C.R. 241.
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equality as opposed to formal equality. However, I would argue that we are
increasingly seeing judicial language that seems to indicate that some
version of Post's description of the "simple but powerful logic" of American
anti-discrimination law' 9 exists inside the section 15(1) jurisprudence
alongside a version of the sociological account that has informed the idea
of substantive equality. We have failed, in my view, to effectively excavate
the underlying normative assumptions of our regime of constitutional
equality, and we have failed to recognize that law is simply one social
practice among many.2° In other words, we must stop being smug when we
compare our equality law to the American version. We need to get down
to business. What is it we are trying to accomplish with anti-discrimination
law?
Siegel writes that she was "simultaneously compelled by [Post's]
claims and yet despairing of them., 21 This was my reaction to the entire
volume. Though the arguments are incisive, offering new arguments for
explaining and dissecting the logic of Canadian anti-discrimination law, they
do not offer much by way of doctrinal reconstruction. This is because of the
differences between American and Canadian equality doctrine. Lacking the
"colour blindness" rhetoric, and speaking the language of context,
Canadian doctrine ostensibly follows many of Post's suggestions.
However, as Post challenges Canadian jurisprudence, the reverse
may also be true. Canadian doctrine does not require "blindness," and
allows, in both text and jurisprudence, significant taking into account of
difference.22 Our dominant approach (whatever it is) is certainly not the
one under which the Americans labour. Our jurisprudence considers
historical context and underlying purposes, the great achievements that
Post sees in Justice Brennan's decisions in United Steelworkers v. Weber"2
and Johnson v. TransportationAgency.24 Our doctrine does not differentiate

19

.Post, "Prejudicial Appearances," supra note 6 at 14. Post cites Paul Brest for an authoritative
summary of this logic: an "antidiscrimination principle" that "disfavor[s] classifications and other
decisions and practices that depend on the race ...
of the parties." See Paul Brest, "The Supreme Court,
1975 Term-Foreword: In Defence of the Antidiscrimination Principle" (1976) 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at 1.
20 Where PrejudicialAppearanceslooks at both ordinary statutes and the U.S. Constitution, my
discussion of the Canadian situation will focus on the approach to equality under the Charter.
21 Siegel, supra note 14 at 148.
22 See Charter,supra note 18. See e.g. Eaton, supra note 18.
23 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
24 See Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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between facially neutral and facially explicit laws? 5 Can we say we have
accountability, doctrinal integrity, and purposive clarity: the benefits of the
sociological account, according to Post? 26 I would answer no. Perhaps our
failure in this respect is because the commitment to the sociological account
is incomplete. Perhaps we retain our own rhetoric ("human dignity"?) that
serves to obscure the driving logic of section 15(1) jurisprudence. The final
possibility is that the sociological account is, to a certain extent,
incompatible with the "rule of law." Both Grey and Siegel question Post's
conclusion that clarity will follow from the sociological approach, 27 and Post
actually concedes this point, noting that "the insights yielded by a
sociological apprehension of antidiscrimination law could encourage overly
ad hoc and contextualized judgments." 28 He could be describing Gosselin
and Trociuk.29
In Canada, the embrace of contextual analysis was widely seen as
helpful to equality-seeking groups for precisely the reasons Siegel
describes-it would admit "what everybody knows" into the doctrine.3 °
Context was intended to defeat cold logic, so that the absence or existence
of formal categorizations would not "make or break" any equality claim.
However, these contextual analyses appear to have opened the door to
judgments based on "common sense."
The invitation to consider context has been used as an excuse to
consider or ignore contexts at will. The contextually sensitive nature of the
analysis set out in Law3 is an effective cover for judgments that choose to
follow some other road without discussion. There is frequent resort to the
use of vague terms and definitions which have almost infinite meanings.
It is in this sense that it is a mistake to equate the move to a
contextual approach with a move to a sociological approach. If judges are
convinced that what amounts to common sense is not discriminatory, then
anti-discrimination law will never succeed in changing social practices. It
25 See Post, "Prejudicial Appearances," supra note 5 at 52; Andrews v. Law Society of Upper
Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 173-74 (per McIntyre J. for the majority on this point indicating that laws
that have a differential impact may violate the equality provision of the Charter).
26 See Post, supra note 5 at 42-50.
27 See Siegel, supra note 14 at 148; Grey, supra note 11 at 95-96.
28 Robert C. Post, "Response to Commentators" in PrejudicialAppearances,supra note 1, 153 at
153.
29 Supra note 3; Trociuk v. British Columbia (A.G.), [20031 1 S.C.R. 835 [Trociuk].
30 See Siegel, supra note 14 at 139-41 (discussing the importance of "what everybody knows" in
the history of race jurisprudence in the United States, specifically the tendency of Court majorities to
ignore it).
31 Law v.Canada (Ministry of Employment and Immigration), [19991 1 S.C.R.
497.
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will only condemn actions that are already the subject of some undefined
societal consensus, actions that common sense would not support. This is
one possible approach to anti-discrimination law (recall that Post refuses
to set out a program for anti-discrimination law, although Siegel embraces
the anti-subordination approach 32). Is this a defensible approach to antidiscrimination law? Time after time we have seen political, judicial, or
social reconsiderations conclude that what was common sense was also
discriminatory. Segregation was, after all, "common sense" for many
people. In addition to stripping anti-discrimination law of any
transformative potential, relying on common sense is part of a more general
refusal to elaborate the normative dimensions of anti-discrimination law.
Without a clear idea of what we might need to know in order to determine
if something is discriminatory, which arises from the lack of understanding
about what constitutes discrimination, we rely on what we already know.
What "we" know differs among the various possibilities for "we." When the
Supreme Court's intuitions and common sense agree with the Darrell
Trociuks and clash with the Louise Gosselins, the Jeanne Lavoies, and the
Nancy Laws, is it time to worry?
III.

CONCLUSION

Post builds his argument by discussing an ordinance proposed by
the City of Santa Cruz in 1992. The ordinance would have prohibited
discrimination against persons on the basis of "personal appearance."3 3 Post
uses this ordinance to frame his discussion because, he says, moving it
outside the familiar territory of gender and race will illustrate the limits of
the "logic of American antidiscrimination law." But he maintains this focus
on appearances throughout the argument.34 I think that part of the common
sense notion of discrimination is that it is a kind of "judging a book by its
cover," that it involves drawing conclusions from appearance. It is a
challenge to that logic to ask for an explanation for why we include race and
gender but not other aspects of appearance, such as obesity. However,
things that may not "appear" require more excavation. What of things that
might not appear, like citizenship and sexual orientation? I do not fault
Post's choice of story, but by focusing on questions of appearance and
hiring, some issues that are more likely to come up in other circumstances
32 See Siegel, supra note 14 at 141-42.
33 See Post, supra note 5 at
2.
34 Ibid. at 11-14 where Post does recognize non-appearance-based forms of discrimination, for
instance marital status and religion as well as group membership more generally.
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(for example, failure to provide benefits) and raise different concerns are
left out.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to contemporary anti-discrimination
doctrine is how to deal with the question of discrimination on the basis of
poverty or class. While the rhetoric of Canadian doctrine can be employed
to support such claims,35 it is easy to predict judicial unease and resistance
to these applications of the Charter.3 6 We need our judges to be more
explicit about the account of equality they are working with, and about the
substantive content of their common sense. Otherwise I fear that attempts
to argue the proper place of poverty in equality jurisprudence are not
addressing the common sense issues. All of us, judges, litigants, scholars,
and Canadians, would benefit from a better understanding of what the law
is doing, so that we can argue about what the law ought to be doing.
PrejudicialAppearances is a book that Canadian equality law scholars
should appreciate for more than just the elegant and thoughtful writing. It
ought to remind us of the large (and perhaps growing) gaps in our own
equality law scholarship, and push us to investigate more closely the logic
behind Canadian equality jurisprudence.

See e.g. Martha Jackman, "Constitutional Contact with the Disparities in the World:
Poverty
as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination under the Canadian CharterandHuman Rights Law" (1994)
2 Rev. Const. Stud. 76; Martha Jackman, "Constitutional Rhetoric and Social Justice: Reflections on
the Justiciability Debate" in Joel Bakan & David Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and The
Constitution:Perspectives on a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992) 25.
36 See e.g. Nitya Iyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity"
(1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179 at 189 (arguing that "'socioeconomic status' or 'poverty' will be hard to
present as analogous because, within a capitalist liberal ideology, this is understood to be a product of
individual choice and merit").

